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Challenging the Executive: The Constitutionality of 
Congressional Regulation of the President’s Wartime 
Detention Policies 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The war on terrorism has involved several clashes on the political 
home front, with the President and Congress asserting conflicting 
policies. A recent example is Congress’s effort to deny funding to 
transfer detainees from Guantánamo Bay to the United States for 
prosecution and to place strict, almost impossible conditions on the 
President’s use of funds to release or transfer detainees to other 
countries.  
In the study of national security law, especially during the war on 
terrorism, “the lion’s share of academic attention” has focused on 
the scenario reflected in Justice Jackson’s Youngstown Category II 
analysis, which examines the President’s inherent authority to act in 
the absence of congressional authorization.1 Yet Youngstown 
Category III scenarios, where presidential action conflicts with 
congressional authorization, are “now at the forefront of the most 
important clashes between the political branches” and deserve more 
careful attention.2 Most studies using the Youngstown framework 
focus on the scope of presidential power—either in absence or in 
contravention of congressional authorization.3 However, the 
Youngstown framework is also relevant to a crucial correlative 
question: When are congressionally imposed restrictions on the 
 
 1. David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest 
Ebb—Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689, 
693 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem]; see Youngstown Sheet & 
Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (devising three 
categories with which to analyze the scope of presidential foreign affairs power). 
 2. Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 1, at 693. 
 3. See, e.g., Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. 
COMMENT. 87, 124–45 (2002) (arguing that courts and scholars improperly focus on 
interpreting congressional intent when the real issue is constitutional interpretation of the 
President’s powers). There are, of course, exceptions to this approach. See generally, e.g., David 
J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A 
Constitutional History, 121 HARV. L. REV. 941 (2008) [hereinafter, Barron & Lederman, A 
Constitutional History] (analyzing the history of congressional involvement in war to 
determine the scope of presidential war powers). 
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President unconstitutional? This question arises regardless of 
whether the President eventually acts in contravention of the will of 
Congress. 
Louis Fisher has warned that “[t]he precise jurisdictions and 
fields of operation for Congress and the President will always elude 
us.”4 Regardless of the difficulty in reaching an ultimate conclusion, 
a comprehensive framework is necessary for evaluating the scope of 
Congress’s constitutional authority when Congress seeks to limit the 
President’s wartime or foreign affairs authority. This Comment 
argues that Congress may constitutionally constrain the President as 
long as the legislative action does not violate a mandatory provision 
or express restriction of the Constitution and does not impede on an 
exclusive presidential power. Therefore, an appropriate analytical 
framework should involve the following considerations: (1) 
mandatory provisions of the Constitution; (2) express restrictions on 
the authority of Congress or the federal government; (3) the scope 
of the relevant constitutional grants of power for each branch; and 
(4) whether a particular power is exclusively lodged in one branch. 
As the following discussion will suggest, the constitutionality of a 
particular restriction is a highly contextual analysis that depends on 
the specific powers in question. This Comment argues that under 
this framework, the recent restrictions on the President’s authority to 
prosecute detainees and the restrictions on the transfer of detainees 
to other countries are constitutional. 
This Comment will proceed as follows: Part II will present the 
problem of the conflicting presidential and congressional policies 
regarding Guantánamo Bay. Part III will present a framework for 
analyzing the constitutionality of congressional restrictions. Part IV 
will apply this framework by looking at the constitutional sources 
and scope of presidential and congressional authority over wartime 
detention and foreign negotiations. Part V will conclude. 
II. PRESIDENTIAL & CONGRESSIONAL GUANTÁNAMO BAY POLICY 
President Obama faces growing congressional resistance to his 
detention policies. A brief discussion of the political climate sets the 
stage for a discussion of the most recent restrictions Congress has 
placed on the President. 
 
 4. LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS BETWEEN CONGRESS AND THE 
PRESIDENT 291 (5th ed. rev. 2007) [hereinafter FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS]. 
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A. Political Climate 
While campaigning for the presidency, Barack Obama promised 
that, once in office, he would close the detention facilities at 
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba.5 The Bush Administration had used the 
detention center to hold suspected terrorists away from the 
battlefield but outside the reach of the United States judicial system.6 
That policy brought strong criticism by political opponents and 
international observers.7 Within days of taking office, President 
Obama declared that he would close the facility within one year, by 
January 22, 2010.8 
Although the closure of Guantánamo Bay is the hallmark of 
President Obama’s detention policy, other aspects of the policy 
include reassessment of the basis for detention of each detainee, 
possible release or relocation, trial by military commission, and, for a 
select few, prosecution in federal court.9 These plans have faced 
several hurdles—including significant public opposition to relocating 
detainees to the United States—that have prevented the 
Administration from reaching its goal of closing Guantánamo.10 
In response to the public outcry, Congress cut off funds for the 
release or transfer of Guantánamo Bay detainees into the United 
States. Congress placed funding restrictions in six separate laws in 
2009 and 2010.11 Each law made exceptions that allowed the 
 
 5. See, e.g., Steven Lee Myers, Bush Decides to Keep Guantánamo Open, N.Y. TIMES, 
Oct. 21, 2008, at A16 (contrasting the position of President Bush on Guantánamo Bay with 
the positions of presidential candidates Sen. Barack Obama and Sen. John McCain), available 
at http://tinyurl.com/NYTimesGitmo. 
 6. MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40139, CLOSING THE 
GUANTANAMO DETENTION CENTER: LEGAL ISSUES 2 (Mar. 28, 2011). 
 7. See, e.g., Warren Hoge, Investigators for U.N. Urge U.S. to Close Guantánamo, N.Y. 
TIMES, Feb. 17, 2006, at A6, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/02/17/ 
international/17nations.html?ref=guantanamobaynavalbasecuba. 
 8. GARCIA ET AL., supra note 6, at 3; Exec. Order No. 13492, 3 C.F.R. 203, 205 
(2009). 
 9. Exec. Order No. 13492, 3 C.F.R. 205–06.  
 10. According to one poll, seventy-four percent of respondents opposed relocating 
Guantánamo Bay detainees to prisons in the respondents’ home states. Jeffrey M. Jones, 
Americans Oppose Closing Gitmo and Moving Prisoners to U.S., GALLUP (June 3, 2009), 
http://tinyurl.com/3pxzk9k. See also GARCIA ET AL., supra note 6, at 3–5 (discussing 
congressional opposition to President Obama’s policies). 
 11. See MICHAEL JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40754, GUANTANAMO 
DETENTION CENTER: LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 3–4 (Jan. 13, 2011) 
(identifying laws with restrictions on Guantánamo Bay releases and transfers). The restrictions 
appeared both in legislation authorizing and appropriating funds. Id. Whether funding 
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President to transfer detainees to the United States “for the purposes 
of prosecuting such individual, or detaining such individual during 
legal proceedings.”12 Despite this allowance, the laws contained 
some restrictions on transfers for the purpose of prosecution. For 
example, the first law to impose these restrictions only allowed the 
President to transfer detainees to the United States forty-five days 
after submitting to Congress a classified “plan” for each detainee.13 
The plan had to include a national security risk assessment, steps to 
mitigate that risk, a cost analysis, and a statement of the “legal 
rationale and associated court demands.”14 The law also required the 
President to notify the governor of the receiving state two weeks 
before the transfer and certify “that the individual poses little or no 
security risk.”15 While subsequent laws added a few elements to the 
reporting requirement, they did not significantly increase the burden 
on the President.16 The only restriction placed on releasing or 
transferring detainees to other countries was a reporting 
requirement: fifteen days before the move, the President had to 
notify Congress of the detainees’ identities and destinations and 
provide risk assessments, risk mitigation plans, and the “terms of any 
agreement”—including any financial agreement—with the receiving 
countries.17 
 
restrictions appear in authorization or appropriation legislation is irrelevant to whether such 
restrictions are a valid restraint on the executive. See Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, 
Pulling the Purse Strings of the Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 839–45 (1994) 
(arguing that there is no constitutional difference among appropriations, authorizations, and 
other substantive legislation).   
 12. Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(c), 123 Stat. 
1859, 1920 (2009). 
 13. Id. § 14103(d). 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. § 14103(d)(5). 
 16. See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 
111-83, § 552(d)(1), (2), 123 Stat. 2142, 2178–79 (2009) (adding an assessment “of the risk 
that the individual might instigate an act of terrorism” if transferred, or “that the individual 
might advocate, coerce, or incite violent extremism, ideologically motivated criminal activity, 
or acts of terrorism, among inmate populations at incarceration facilities”); see also MICHAEL 
JOHN GARCIA, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40754, GUANTANAMO DETENTION CENTER: 
LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITY IN THE 111TH CONGRESS 6–9 (Dec. 9, 2010) (discussing the 
restrictions and reporting requirements in the various laws). 
 17. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-83, 
§ 552(e), 123 Stat. at 2178–79. Some transfers have involved promises of increased foreign aid 
to the receiving country. See Charlie Savage & Andrew W. Lehren, Cables Depict Coaxing by 
U.S. in Bid to Clear Guantánamo’s Prison, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2010, at A1, available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/30/world/americas/30gitmo.html. 
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Two events occurred in late 2010 that provided the catalyst for 
Congress to take a more aggressive approach: the return of a verdict 
in the case of U.S. embassy bomber Ahmed Khalfan Ghailani, and 
the release of a report from the Director of National Intelligence 
(DNI) on recidivism rates among detainees released to other 
countries. 
On November 17, 2010, a jury returned a verdict on the first 
Guantánamo Bay detainee prosecution in federal courts.18 The jury 
found Ghailani guilty of one count of conspiracy to destroy 
government property; he was acquitted of the remaining 284 
counts.19 Key testimony that may have proved dispositive was found 
inadmissible because it had been obtained by coercive interrogation 
techniques.20 The Justice Department and supporters of civilian trials 
for suspected terrorists hailed the guilty verdict as a victory for the 
Administration and a sign of the potential for further successful 
criminal prosecutions.21 Critics saw it differently. They feared that 
the verdict came too close to letting a Guantánamo Bay detainee free 
on U.S. soil.22 
Three weeks after the Ghailani verdict, the DNI released a report 
at the request of Congress which provided further fodder for the 
Administration’s critics. The report declared that twenty-five percent 
of detainees released to other countries were suspected or confirmed 
to have “reengage[d] in terrorist or insurgent activities after 
transfer.”23 Furthermore, the report predicted that future releases 
 
 18. Benjamin Weiser, U.S. Jury Acquits Former Detainee of Most Charges, N.Y. TIMES, 
Nov. 18, 2010, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/18/nyregion/ 
18ghailani.html?ref=nyregion. 
 19. Id.  
 20. Charlie Savage, Terror Verdict Tests Obama’s Strategy on Trials, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 
19, 2010), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/19/nyregion/19detainees.html. 
 21.  See id. 
 22. See id. 
 23. DIRECTOR OF NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE, SUMMARY OF THE REENGAGEMENT OF 
DETAINEES FORMERLY HELD AT GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBA, (Dec. 7, 2010), 
http://www.dni.gov/electronic_reading_room/120710_Summary_of_the_Reengagement_of
_Detainees_Formerly_Held_at_Guantanamo_Bay_Cuba.pdf. The report defines “terrorist or 
insurgent activities” as “planning terrorist operations, conducting a terrorist or insurgent attack 
against Coalition or host-nation forces or civilians, conducting a suicide bombing, financing 
terrorist operations, recruiting others for terrorist operations, arranging for movement of 
individuals involved in terrorist operations, etc.” Id. The definition explicitly excludes “mere 
communications with individuals or organizations—including other former GTMO 
detainees—on issues not related to terrorist operations, such as reminiscing over shared 
experiences at GTMO, communicating with past terrorist associates about non-nefarious 
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would also result in at least some degree of recidivism.24 When the 
report was released, it was instantly used as a talking point for critics 
of the Administration’s detention policies.25 
B. Tightening the Purse Strings 
The Ghailani verdict and the DNI report served as rallying cries 
for the President’s opponents. Using its appropriations power, 
Congress determined to stop prosecutions and significantly tighten 
controls on the transfer and release of detainees to other countries. 
In the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress 
prohibited the use of any funds authorized under the Act “to 
transfer, release, or assist in the transfer or release [of Guantánamo 
Bay detainees] to or within the United States, its territories, or 
possessions . . . .”26 Unlike previous restrictions, however, this 
prohibition did not include an exception for prosecution.27 While the 
Act does not explicitly prohibit prosecution, a blanket prohibition on 
transfer to the United States has the same effect—and was intended 
to do so.28 Furthermore, the prohibition appears to restrict the 
executive branch as a whole, even though the provision is limited to 
Department of Defense funds. If the Department of Justice or 
another executive department were to transfer detainees, it would 
 
activities, writing anti-U.S. books or articles, or making anti-U.S. propaganda statements.” Id. 
 24. Id. At the time of the report, 598 detainees had been released or transferred out of 
Guantánamo Bay. The Obama Administration had released sixty-six detainees outside of the 
habeas process. The report noted that although the recidivism rate was lower among these 
detainees, there appears to be a two-and-a-half-year lag before the recidivists return to 
terrorism. Id. 
 25. See, e.g., Ryan Famuliner, Gitmo Recidivism Report Concerns Sen. Bond, 
MISSOURINET.COM (Dec. 9, 2010), http://www.missourinet.com/2010/12/09/gitmo-
recidivism-report-concerns-sen-bond-audio/. 
 26. Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011, Pub. L. No. 
111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4351 (2011) [hereinafter 2011 National Defense Authorization 
Act]. The restriction is limited to detainees held at Guantánamo Bay “on or after January 20, 
2009,” and does not apply to non-citizen members of the U.S. Armed Forces. Id. 
 27.  See id.; see also GARCIA, supra note 11, at 4–5. 
 28. See GARCIA, supra note 11, at 5 & n.21 (discussing statements of legislators 
discussing the restrictions). The Act specifically denies funds for the transfer of Khalid Sheikh 
Mohammed and then expands the denial to other detainees held at Guantánamo Bay. See 2011 
National Defense Authorization Act § 1032. Mohammed has been the focal point of the 
Administration’s policy of prosecuting some detainees in U.S. civilian courts. See, e.g., ERIC 
HOLDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL ANNOUNCES FORUM DECISIONS FOR 
GUANTANAMO DETAINEES (Nov. 13, 2009), http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/ 
2009/ag-speech-091113.html.  
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likely need the assistance of the Department of Defense, which has 
custody over the Guantánamo Bay detainees. The Act prohibits such 
assistance.29 
The Act also severely limits the transfer of detainees to other 
countries. It does so by limiting potential host countries and 
effectively setting the essential terms of any negotiations to transfer 
detainees. Before using any funds “available to the Department of 
Defense” to transfer a detainee overseas, the Secretaries of Defense 
and State must certify to Congress thirty days in advance that the 
receiving state (1) is not a sponsor of terrorism; (2) “maintains 
effective control” over its detention facilities; (3) is not “facing a 
threat that is likely to substantially affect its ability to exercise control 
over the individual”; (4) has agreed to “ensure” that the detainee 
cannot “threaten the United States, its citizens, or its allies in the 
future”; (5) “has taken such steps as the Secretary determines are 
necessary to ensure that the individual cannot engage or reengage in 
any terrorist activity”; and (6) has agreed to share intelligence 
information with the United States.30 Without a waiver from the 
Secretary of Defense that the transfer “is in the national security 
interests of the United States,” all transfers are prohibited whenever 
“there is a confirmed case of any” former Guantánamo Bay detainee 
having “subsequently engaged in any terrorist activity” after transfer 
to that country.31 One exception to all of these restrictions is the 
transfer of detainees in accordance with an order from a habeas 
court.32 
Coupled with the unwillingness of many countries to take 
detainees, these conditions make it almost impossible to transfer 
detainees who have not been ordered released through the habeas 
 
 29. See 2011 National Defense Authorization Act § 1032 (“None of the funds 
authorized to be appropriated by this Act for fiscal year 2011 may be used to transfer, release, 
or assist in the transfer or release [of Guantánamo Bay detainees] to or within the United 
States.” (emphasis added)); see also GARCIA, supra note 11, at 5. But see ACLU, LETTER TO 
PRESIDENT BARACK OBAMA (Jan. 5, 2011), available at http://tinyurl.com/3ggsbab 
(arguing that other executive departments would be free to transfer detainees). 
 30. 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, § 1033(a)–(b). 
 31. Id. § 1033(c). 
 32. Id. § 1033(a)(2), (c)(3). Since the Supreme Court recognized the detainees’ right 
to habeas relief in Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008), courts have granted habeas 
relief to thirty-seven detainees, twenty-four of whom have been released; the remaining 
population at Guantánamo Bay is 172. Guantanamo Habeas Scorecard, CTR. FOR 
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, http://ccrjustice.org/GTMOscorecard (last updated Feb. 9, 
2011). 
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process.33 President Obama opposed these restrictions, but he signed 
the bill into law because the restrictions were a small part of a much 
larger bill authorizing funding for the military.34 In his signing 
statement, however, President Obama stated that the restrictions on 
transferring detainees to the United States “represent[] a dangerous 
and unprecedented challenge to critical executive branch authority” 
over prosecution of Guantánamo detainees and could ultimately 
“undermine[] our Nation’s counterterrorism efforts . . . [and] harm 
our national security.”35 He asserted that the restrictions on transfers 
to other countries “interfere” with the President’s foreign policy and 
national security authority to make “consequential” decisions “in the 
context of an ongoing armed conflict.”36 He stated that the 
President “must have the ability to act swiftly and to have broad 
flexibility in conducting our negotiations with foreign countries.”37 
President Obama did not go so far as to call the restrictions 
unconstitutional, nor did he express any intention to ignore the 
restrictions. Rather, he said he would “work with the Congress to 
seek repeal of these restrictions, . . . seek to mitigate their effects, 
and . . . oppose any attempt to extend or expand them in the 
future.”38 The President has since reasserted these objections,39 as 
has Attorney General Eric Holder. On April 4, 2011, Attorney 
General Holder announced that the Administration would try Khalid 
Sheikh Mohammed and four other 9/11 conspirators in military 
commissions,40 effectively abandoning the Administration’s 
 
 33. See Robert Chesney, Key Points from Today’s Executive Order on GTMO Detention 
Review, LAWFARE BLOG (Mar. 7, 2011, 4:02 PM), http://tinyurl.com/3pwgmaj (“Absent a 
habeas order compelling a release, current legislation makes it nearly impossible to effectuate a 
release from GTMO. The long and short of it is that the Secretary of Defense must make a 
series of rather difficulty [sic] certifications, arguably impossible to meet in most 
circumstances.”). 
 34. Press Release, President Barack Obama, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, 
Statement by the President on H.R. 6523 (Jan. 7, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2011/01/07/statement-president-hr-6523. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Press Release, President Barack Obama, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, 
New Actions on Guantanamo Bay Detainee Policy (Mar. 7, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/ 
43yocc7; Fact Sheet: New Actions on Guantanamo and Detainee Policy, WHITE HOUSE OFFICE 
OF THE PRESS SEC’Y (Mar. 7, 2011), http://tinyurl.com/3jy97ow. 
 40. Statement of Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Statement of the 
Attorney General on the Prosecution of the 9/11 Conspirators (Apr. 4, 2011), 
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commitment to try these individuals in federal court. Yet Attorney 
General Holder reiterated the Administration’s preference for civilian 
trials and declared that the Administration would “continue to seek 
to repeal those restrictions.”41 
Observers have criticized the Administration for not taking a 
stronger position on this issue—or at least a more consistent 
position.42 Emboldened by the Administration’s response, the House 
of Representatives included similar provisions in the 2012 National 
Defense Authorization Act.43 Perhaps in response to the earlier 
criticism, the Administration threatened to veto the Act if it 
contained these restrictions.44 The Administration reiterated his 
concerns about the “dangerous and unprecedented challenge” the 
restrictions posed to the President’s prosecutorial discretion and 
stated that the foreign transfer restrictions interfered with his 
national security and foreign affairs powers.45 But unlike several other 
provisions in the 2012 National Defense Authorization Act for 
which the Administration issued a veto threat, it did not say that the 
detainee restrictions raised constitutional concerns.46 Ultimately, the 
 
http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2011/ag-speech-110404.html. 
 41. Id. 
 42. See ACLU, supra note 29 (urging President Obama to take the position that the 
restriction only applied to the Department of Defense or, alternatively, that the restrictions 
were unconstitutional); Benjamin Wittes, Whining Statement, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 7, 2011, 
6:57 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/01/whining-statement/; Benjamin Wittes, 
Thought #1 on the Holder Statement, LAWFARE BLOG (Apr. 4, 2011, 4:11 PM), 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/04/thought-1-on-the-holder-statement/; see also Jack 
Goldsmith, The Weakness in the Obama Signing Statement, LAWFARE BLOG (Jan. 9, 2011, 
12:36 PM), http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/01/the-weakness-in-the-obama-signing-
statement/. 
 43.  See H.R. 1540, 112th Cong. §§ 1039–40 (as passed by House, May 26, 2011). 
Under this version of the bill, the restriction on transfers to the United States would extend 
beyond Guantánamo Bay to cover detainees held at other overseas locations. See id. § 1039. 
The restrictions on transfers to foreign countries would be less stringent than the 2011 
National Defense Authorization Act in one regard: rather than agreeing to a general 
commitment to share intelligence information with the United States, receiving countries 
would only need to agree to share intelligence relating to the transferred detainee. See id. § 
1040(a)(2)(F).  
 44. EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT & BUDGET, 
STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 1540—NATIONAL DEFENSE 
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FY 2012 (May 24, 2011), http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/omb/legislative/sap/112/saphr1540r_20110524.pdf (last visited Oct. 29, 
2011). 
 45.  Id. 
 46.  See id. 
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House ignored the threat and retained the provisions.47 In light of 
the earlier criticism of the President, could he have taken an even 
stronger stance? Could he have legitimately argued that the 
restrictions are unconstitutional? 
III. YOUNGSTOWN CATEGORY III AND THE LIMITS OF 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER 
Wartime constitutional conflicts often are analyzed from the 
perspective of presidential power, and scholars often are concerned 
primarily with the President’s inherent authority to act in 
contravention of the will of Congress. The scope of congressional 
power is a necessary component in this analysis given the shared 
nature of most foreign affairs and war powers, and the question of 
whether Congress can constitutionally restrain the President deserves 
attention regardless of whether the President ultimately acts in 
contravention of the will of Congress. Justice Robert Jackson’s 
Youngstown framework is useful in assessing these questions, but it 
must be viewed as part of a larger framework for assessing 
congressional power to restrain the President. 
A. Youngstown Category III from the Perspective of Congressional 
Power 
In his concurrence to Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
Justice Jackson suggested that the scope of presidential power could 
be analyzed under three categories.48 Category I involves the 
President and Congress acting in concert; in this case, presidential 
power is at its height.49 Category II involves the President acting in 
the face of congressional silence or acquiescence; in this situation, 
presidential power is in an uncertain “zone of twilight.”50 Category 
III involves the President acting in a way “incompatible with the 
expressed or implied will of Congress”; here, “[presidential] power is 
at its lowest ebb.”51 
 
 47.  The House passed the bill on May 26, 2011. The Senate has yet to pass the bill. See, 
Bill Summary & Status, 112th Congress, H.R. 1540, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS THOMAS, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/thomas.php# (last visited Oct. 20, 2011). 
 48. 343 U.S. 579, 635–38 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 49. Id. at 635–37. 
 50. Id. at 637. 
 51. Id. 
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The conflict between the President and Congress over 
Guantánamo Bay policy involves perhaps an atypical Youngstown 
Category III scenario. Justice Jackson’s framework presupposes 
presidential action. In the Guantánamo Bay dispute, the President 
has yet to act. He has only rhetorically challenged the authority of 
Congress to intrude upon his prerogatives; in practice, he has 
acquiesced to the congressional restrictions. From a political and 
constitutional perspective, such acquiescence will make it harder to 
seek repeal of the provisions and more likely that the President’s veto 
threat will go unheeded unless the President can persuasively argue 
that Congress lacks constitutional authority for these actions.52 This 
scenario thus highlights the importance of determining the scope of 
Congress’s power to restrain the President. 
B. A Test for Determining the Extent of Congressional Power 
Even though Justice Jackson viewed the specific facts in 
Youngstown as involving a Category III scenario, his concurrence 
unfortunately provides little guidance on how a Category III analysis 
should proceed.53 Justice Jackson suggests a precise calculus—the 
President “can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus 
any constitutional powers of Congress over the matter”—but this 
formulation is misleading in its supposed precision and unhelpful in 
its mathematical abstraction.54 Furthermore, Justice Jackson’s 
Category III analysis should be seen as one part of a larger analysis of 
constitutional conflicts. 
This Comment argues that a comprehensive framework for 
evaluating the constitutional limits on the power of Congress under 
Youngstown Category III involves four considerations: (1) 
constitutionally mandated activities; (2) express restrictions on 
congressional or federal power; (3) the scope of the express or 
 
 52.  Cf. id. at 610–11 (Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] a systematic, unbroken, 
executive practice, long pursued to the knowledge of the Congress and never before 
questioned, . . . may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the President by § 1 
of Art. II [of the Constitution].”); Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 11, at 849–50 (“[T]his 
interaction may create customary national security law. The custom evidences the political 
branches’ joint interpretation of the President’s constitutional or statutory authority.”). 
 53. See Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 638–40 (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 54. Id. at 637. As will be discussed below, however, this equation does provide an 
essential key to analyzing constitutional conflicts. See infra notes 73–80 and accompanying 
text. 
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implied powers of each branch; and (4) whether constitutional 
authority rests exclusively in one branch. 
1. Constitutionally mandated activities 
The first limit on congressional power is perhaps the narrowest. 
Congress may not prevent the performance of any constitutionally 
mandated activity.55 For example, the Constitution requires a census 
to be conducted every ten years.56 While Congress is given discretion 
over the “manner” in which the census will be conducted, Congress 
would be in violation of the Constitution if it failed to provide funds 
for the census or if it passed a law prohibiting the President from 
conducting the census.57 Perhaps the only mandatory requirement 
that could be related to war powers or foreign affairs is that Congress 
must provide for the President’s salary.58 If Congress made the 
President’s salary contingent upon pursuit of a particular foreign 
affairs or defense policy, the legislature would likely be in violation of 
this provision. Professor Kate Stith has suggested other relevant 
mandatory provisions: “Congress itself would violate the 
Constitution if it refused to appropriate funds for the President to 
receive foreign ambassadors or to make treaties.”59 Although this 
may be the appropriate reading of the Ambassadors Clause, the use 
of the word “shall” in the Treaties Clause, at least, is more naturally 
read to designate who shall conduct the activity rather than to 
require that the activity be conducted.60 
 
 55.  Kate Stith, Congress’ Power of the Purse, 97 YALE L.J. 1343, 1350–51 (1987–1988) 
(“Congress is obliged to provide public funds for constitutionally mandated activities—both 
obligations imposed upon the government generally and independent constitutional activities 
of the President.”). 
 56. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“The actual Enumeration shall be made within three 
Years after the first meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent 
Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct.”). The purpose of this 
requirement is to ensure just apportionment of representation in the House of Representatives 
and of taxes. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 36, at 187–93 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 
1898). 
 57. Stith, supra note 55, at 1351 n.31. 
 58. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall, at stated Times, receive for 
his Services, a Compensation . . . .”); id. at art. I, § 9, cl. 7 (“No Money shall be drawn from 
the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”). 
 59. Stith, supra note 55, at 1351.  
 60.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[H]e shall receive Ambassadors and other public 
Ministers . . . .”); id. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and 
Consent of the Senate, to make treaties . . . .”). 
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2. Express restrictions 
The next consideration involves express restrictions on federal 
power. When the legislature is denied all power under the 
Constitution to undertake a certain act, the restriction applies 
regardless of whether Congress would otherwise be acting within the 
scope of a constitutional grant of power.61 The most obvious 
examples would be the prohibitions on bills of attainder,62 ex post 
facto laws,63 and reducing the judicial salary or the President’s salary 
for the present term.64 Individual rights protections in the Bill of 
Rights would also fall into this category. For example, Congress 
generally may not require the President to curtail someone’s First 
Amendment rights.65 Similarly, violations of structural limitations in 
the Constitution would also be prohibited.66 For example, Congress 
could not place conditional restrictions on the President’s conduct of 
war that required a congressional committee to approve an executive 
decision before funds were released or action was authorized; such 
 
 61. See Louis Fisher, How Tightly Can Congress Draw the Purse Strings?, 83 AM. J. INT’L 
L. 758, 762–63 (1989) [hereinafter Fisher, Purse Strings] (“It is conventional to say that 
Congress, in adding conditions and provisos to appropriations bills, may not achieve 
unconstitutional results.”); Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 11, at 885 (discussing the 
uncontroversial proposition that appropriation legislation may not violate express 
constitutional restrictions). 
 62. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No Bill of Attainder . . . shall be passed.”); United 
States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 305, 311–12, 315–18 (1946) (declaring unconstitutional an 
appropriations measure that denied funding for the salaries of three named federal employees 
who had been found complicit in “subversive activities” by the House Committee on Un-
American Activities). 
 63. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 3 (“No . . . ex post facto Law shall be passed.”). 
 64. Id. art. II, § 1, cl. 7 (“The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his services, a 
Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the period for which he 
shall have been elected . . . .”); id. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges . . . shall, at stated Times, receive 
for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in 
Office.”). 
 65.  See Stith, supra note 55, at 1050 (“[T]he First Amendment imposes a limitation 
upon the exercise of all government powers, including Congress’ appropriations power.” 
(footnote omitted)). However, the protections of individual liberties often depend upon the 
application of a balancing test. In a national security context, balancing individual and 
governmental interests will generally lead to a less potent restriction on government action. 
See, e.g., Sarah N. Rosen, Comment, Be All That You Can Be? An Analysis of and Proposed 
Alternative to Military Speech Regulations, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 875, 880–97 (2009–2010) 
(discussing the Supreme Court’s treatment of military speech restrictions in comparison to 
civilian speech restrictions). 
 66. Cf. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983) (overruling provisions that allowed one 
house of Congress to “veto” the decision of an executive agency because such procedures 
violated the bicameralism and presentment clauses). 
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action would violate the bicameralism and presentment requirements 
in the Constitution.67 Some of the limits in this category thus reflect 
an absolute lack of legislative authority,68 while others entail a more 
contextual analysis that involves balancing government and 
individual interests.69 
3. Scope of the constitutional grant 
The third consideration—the scope of the express or implied 
powers of each branch—requires little justification, but perhaps some 
clarification. In a sense, each category of limitations goes to the 
scope of Congress’s power. But once it has been determined that 
Congress is not required to act or forbidden from acting in a certain 
manner, the inquiry must turn to an examination of the meaning of 
express or implied constitutional grants of power relevant to the 
particular statute under consideration. As part of a limited 
government, Congress must act pursuant to an express or implied 
grant of power in the Constitution.70 Even if Congress’s implied 
powers are read broadly under the Necessary and Proper Clause,71 
there must still be some foundation in the Constitution for 
 
 67. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2 (“Every Bill which shall have passed the House of 
Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of 
the United States: If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his 
Objections . . . .”); Chadha, 462 U.S. 919; cf. William P. Barr, Constitutionality of Proposed 
Statutory Provision Requiring Prior Congressional Notification for Certain CIA Covert Actions, 
13 Op. O.L.C. 258, 261 (1989) (providing a similar analogy to illustrate limits on the 
appropriations power). 
 68. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) 
(“By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions to the 
Legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto 
laws, and the like.” (first emphasis added)). 
 69.  See supra note 65. 
 70. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942) (“Congress and the President, like the 
courts, possess no power not derived from the Constitution.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 14, at 
77 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) (“In the first place, it is to be remembered, that 
the General Government is not to be charged with the whole power of making and 
administering laws: its jurisdiction is limited to certain enumerated objects . . . .”); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 81, at 441 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) (“I admit, 
however, that the Constitution ought to be the standard of construction for the laws . . . . 
[T]his doctrine is . . . deducible . . . from the general theory of a limited Constitution . . . .”). 
 71. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, 
and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof.”). 
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congressional action.72 The same holds for presidential action. 
Determining its proper scope is relevant to the next consideration.  
4. Constitutionally exclusive authority 
As Justice Jackson’s Youngstown concurrence suggests, the 
exclusivity of constitutional powers is a necessary consideration in a 
Category III analysis. Elucidating his mathematical formula,73 Justice 
Jackson stated that under Category III, presidential action “can be 
supported only by any remainder of executive power after 
subtraction of such powers as Congress may have over the subject. 
In short, we can sustain the President only by holding that . . . [his 
action] is within his domain and beyond control by Congress.”74 This 
suggests that Congress may not intrude on the President’s domain 
when dealing with constitutional powers that are exclusive to the 
presidential office. The logical corollary to Justice Jackson’s 
formulation is that Congress may restrict the President whenever the 
two branches hold concurrent authority over a matter.75 This 
conclusion is consistent with the basic structure of the federal 
government: the legislative power is vested in Congress while the 
executive power is vested in the President, and the power to execute 
the laws is given shape by the very laws which are to be executed.76 
 
 72. Cf. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) (adopting a broad, but not 
unbounded, reading of the Necessary and Proper Clause); THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 251 
(James Madison) (E. H.. Scott ed., 1898) (“Had the Constitution been silent on this head 
[i.e., the Necessary and Proper Clause], there can be no doubt that all the particular powers, 
requisite as means of executing the general [i.e., enumerated] powers would have resulted to 
the Government, by unavoidable implication.”). 
 73. The President “can rely only upon his own constitutional powers minus any 
constitutional powers of Congress over the matter.” Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 
343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
 74. Id. at 640 (emphasis added). 
 75. See Jules Lobel, Conflicts Between the Commander in Chief and Congress: Concurrent 
Power over the Conduct of War, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 391, 445–51 (2008); id. at 452 (“Under 
Jackson’s Youngstown approach, the President’s power fluctuates based on whether Congress 
has independent, overlapping, concurrent power over the matter. If Congress does, then that 
power negates whatever independent power the President may have in case of a conflict. Only 
where Congress does not have concurrent power can the President’s independent 
constitutional authority trump or override a conflicting statute.” (footnote omitted)). But see 
Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 11, at 887–89 (arguing that when the President and 
Congress have concurrent authority, “courts must weigh the extent to which the restriction 
prevents the President from accomplishing his constitutionally assigned functions against the 
need for the restriction to promote objectives within the authority of Congress”). 
 76. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in 
a Congress of the United States . . . .”); id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power shall be 
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 A Youngstown Category III analysis involves comparing 
presidential and congressional powers over a particular issue to 
determine whether the Constitution gives exclusive rather than 
shared authority to the President. Thus, “exclusive” is not the same 
as “implied,”77 “inherent,”78 “independent,”79 or “core.”80 If 
Congress were to prohibit the President from performing an 
exclusive executive function, either through failing to provide funds 
or enacting other restrictions, it would unconstitutionally intrude on 
the exclusive domain of the President. Similarly, it would be 
unconstitutional for Congress to usurp an exclusive executive 
function. For example, Congress may not receive ambassadors or 
issue pardons.81 The authority of the President to make tactical 
 
vested in a President of the United States of America.”). 
 77. The distinction between whether a power is express or implied aids in a Youngstown 
Category III analysis only to the extent that such a distinction is helpful in determining the 
scope of the relevant constitutional grants of authority. See supra Part III.B.3.  
 78. “It is common for defenders of presidential prerogatives to conflate inherent . . . 
executive war powers with preclusive ones, and to assume that any powers granted by Article II 
must also be immune from statutory limitation.” Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, 
supra note 1, at 741–43. However, inherent presidential power is relevant to a Youngstown 
Category II analysis (where the President acts in the absence of congressional action), not a 
Youngstown Category III analysis (where Congress has acted to limit the President’s 
authority). 
 79. If the President’s power is independent, it arises out of the Constitution rather than 
legislation. But deciding that a presidential power is independent of Congress does not answer 
the question of whether the authority is exclusive or shared. See Lobel, supra note 75, at 447–
49 (distinguishing “exclusive” from “independent” and “inherent” power); id. at 464 (“That 
the President has independent power stemming from his Commander in Chief power means 
that he can act independently of congressional authorization, not in disregard of it.”). As with 
“inherent,” this term is more appropriate for a Youngstown Category II analysis. See 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) 
(“When the President acts in absence of either a congressional grant or denial of authority, he 
can only rely upon his own independent powers . . . .”).  
 80. Professors Barron and Lederman argue that Congress may not intrude on “core” 
executive powers. See Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 1, at 721, 726–
29. Professor Lobel criticizes that approach as inconsistent with Justice Jackson’s formulation 
of a Youngstown Category III analysis because it essentially results in a balancing test. See 
Lobel, supra, note 75, at 451–55 (“The core/periphery framework inappropriately conflates 
centrality with exclusivity.”). However, Professors Barron and Lederman explicitly reject any 
balancing test and argue that their approach is consistent with Youngstown. See Barron & 
Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 1, at 726, 729, 738–39. They also use the term 
“preclusive” in their analysis, which would be consistent with Justice Jackson’s formulation and 
avoids any implication of a balancing test. 
 81. United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128, 147–48 (1872) (“It is the intention 
of the Constitution that each of the great co-ordinate departments of the government—the 
Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial—shall be, in its sphere, independent of the others. 
To the executive alone is intrusted the power of pardon; and it is granted without limit. . . . 
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battlefield decisions has traditionally been viewed as the 
quintessential exclusive executive power upon which Congress may 
not intrude.82 But Professors David Barron and Martin Lederman 
argue that the only exclusive executive authority under the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause is “a prerogative of superintendence 
when it comes to the military chain of command itself.”83 In other 
words, “Congress may not assign such ultimate decisionmaking 
discretion to anyone else (including subordinate military officers).”84 
Professor Jules Lobel has also recently challenged the traditional 
view of exclusive presidential authority. He argues that aside from 
the President’s exclusive “right to command,”85 the President and 
Congress have “concurrent constitutional power over the conduct of 
authorized warfare,” and that any line-drawing between the powers 
of the two branches thus reflects practical and institutional 
considerations rather than constitutional dictates.86   
 However, this Comment argues that a proper Youngstown 
Category III analysis should be highly contextual, focusing on the 
specific legislative action in question and the scope of relevant 
constitutional provisions. The constitutionality of a particular 
restriction cannot be determined by claims of general wartime 
authority. Therefore, the foregoing framework does not 
automatically lead to any conclusions about the ultimate scope of 
presidential and congressional authority. Furthermore, the exclusivity 
element of this framework relates only to a Youngstown Category III 
scenario, where “[presidential] power is at its lowest ebb”87—it says 
 
Now it is clear that the legislature cannot change the effect of such a pardon any more than the 
executive can change a law.”). See also FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS, supra note 4, at 
193; Fisher, Purse Strings, supra note 61, at 762–63. 
 82. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2006) (“Congress cannot direct the 
conduct of campaigns . . . .” (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139 (1866) 
(Chase, C.J., concurring)). 
 83. Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 1, at 696. As noted above, 
Professors Barron and Lederman don’t use the term “exclusive,” but that appears to be the 
essential meaning of their analysis. See supra note 80. 
 84. Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 1, at 697. 
 85. See Lobel, supra note 75, at 450–51. 
 86. See id., at 398 (“Those powers are divided in practice by timing, not subject matter. 
The President has the power of initiative, the ability and authority to act quickly in the face of 
rapidly changing wartime realities in the theater of action. Congress, on the other hand, has a 
more deliberative, reflective power, allowing it to check and limit presidential initiative both 
before and after the Executive acts.” (emphasis omitted)). 
 87. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., 
concurring). 
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nothing about the scope of inherent presidential power to act in the 
face of congressional silence or acquiescence, or the scope of 
presidential power to act with congressional authorization. 
IV. AUTHORITY OVER DETENTION & FOREIGN NEGOTIATIONS: 
CONCURRENT OR EXCLUSIVE? 
The provisions of the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act 
in question are not constrained by any constitutionally mandated 
activities. Therefore, the following Part will first examine potential 
express restrictions on the authority of Congress, ultimately 
concluding that the Act does not violate any express restrictions. 
This Part will then consider the scope of presidential and 
congressional detention authority. In their responses to Congress, 
President Obama and Attorney General Holder suggest that the 
detention restrictions challenge three fundamental presidential 
powers: prosecutorial discretion, war powers, and foreign affairs 
powers.88 This Part will therefore review the scope of any 
constitutional authority for both the President and Congress in each 
of these categories. This discussion reveals that the political branches 
have concurrent authority over wartime detention; therefore, the 
restrictions in the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act are 
constitutional. 
A. Express Restrictions on Congress 
The Suspension Clause and the Bill of Attainder Clause serve as 
two restrictions on congressional power that are potentially relevant 
to the detainee transfer limitations. However, Congress structured 
the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act in such a way as to 
avoid a conflict with the Suspension Clause, and the legislative policy 
behind the Act is such that the Act does not constitute a bill of 
attainder.  
The Suspension Clause declares that “[t]he Privilege of the Writ 
of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of 
Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”89 This serves 
as an express restriction on the power of Congress to limit access to 
federal courts for individuals to challenge their detention by the 
 
 88. See supra notes 35–37, 45, and accompanying text. 
 89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. 
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executive.90 In June 2008, the Supreme Court declared that 
Congress could not deprive Guantánamo Bay detainees of the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus without “act[ing] in 
accordance with the requirements of the Suspension Clause.”91 The 
2011 National Defense Authorization Act restrictions on transferring 
detainees to other countries could run afoul of the Suspension 
Clause if such restrictions prevented the executive from complying 
with the order of a habeas court. However, the Act makes an express 
exception to transfer restrictions in order for the executive “to 
effectuate an order affecting the disposition of the individual that is 
issued by a court or competent tribunal of the United States having 
lawful jurisdiction.”92 The Act thus avoids any conflict with the 
Suspension Clause. 
The impact of the Bill of Attainder Clause is less obvious from 
the face of the Act. The Supreme Court has defined a bill of 
attainder as “a law that legislatively determines guilt and inflicts 
punishment upon an identifiable individual without provision of the 
protections of a judicial trial.”93 Thus, a bill of attainder must meet 
three requirements: “specification of the affected persons, 
punishment, and lack of a judicial trial.”94 The ACLU has argued 
that the transfer restrictions in the 2011 National Defense 
Authorization Act amount to a bill of attainder.95 Because the law 
targets Guantánamo Bay detainees, “the transfer provisions single 
out an identifiable group of people for differential treatment . . . .”96 
The ACLU argued that the restrictions on transfer to the United 
States and to third countries qualify as punishment under bill of 
 
 90. Stephen Vladeck argues that the Suspension Clause is better understood as a grant 
of power to Congress presented in the negative, which gives the legislature the authority to 
suspend the writ under certain circumstances. This in turn “provided structural constitutional 
underpinnings for the common-law right that already existed, and specified the only instances 
in which that right could be abridged.” Stephen Vladeck, The Suspension Clause as a Structural 
Right, 62 U. MIAMI L. REV. 275, 277 (2008). If Vladeck’s position is accurate, Congress’s 
efforts to deny habeas corpus to detainees should be examined under the third consideration: 
construing the scope of a textual grant of power.  
 91. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 771 (2008). 
 92. 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111–383, § 1033(a)(2), 
(c)(3), 124 Stat. 4351–52.  
 93. Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 468 (1977). 
 94. Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Public Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841, 847 
(1984). 
 95. See ACLU, supra note 29. 
 96. Id.  
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attainder precedent because, read in conjunction, the restrictions 
effectively impose “continued imprisonment” at Guantánamo Bay.97 
Finally, the ACLU argued that the punishment was imposed without 
judicial trial “because the vast majority of detainees subject to 
enforced legislative imprisonment will not face trial.”98  
Upon closer examination, the restrictions do not seem to meet 
the punishment requirement of a bill of attainder. A bill of attainder 
is prohibited because it involves “a congressional determination 
of . . . blameworthiness and a desire to punish . . . .”99 To determine 
whether a law is punitive, the Supreme Court has identified three 
inquiries: “(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the 
historical meaning of legislative punishment; (2) whether the statute, 
‘viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed, 
reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes’; 
and (3) whether the legislative record ‘evinces a congressional intent 
to punish.’”100 Imprisonment has historically been viewed as 
punishment,101 but it is not clear that the restrictions in the 2011 Act 
in fact impose imprisonment. At most, the restrictions indirectly 
lengthen a detainee’s imprisonment.102 Yet whether a particular 
detainee’s detention is prolonged depends not solely on the 
legislative act in question, but also upon the executive’s 
determination of when it had planned to release the individual.103 In 
other words, both legislative and executive action are required to 
inflict punishment in this case, creating uncertainty as to which 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 476 (1977). “The fact that harm is 
inflicted by governmental authority does not make it punishment. Figuratively speaking all 
discomforting action may be deemed punishment because it deprives of what otherwise would 
be enjoyed. But there may be reasons other than punitive for such deprivation.” Id. at 470 
n.32 (quoting United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303, 324 (1946) (Frankfurter, J., 
concurring)) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 100. See Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 852 
(1984) (quoting Nixon, 433 U.S. at 475–76, 478). 
 101. Id. 
 102. The ACLU seems to acknowledge that the “punishment” imposed is not 
imprisonment but “continued imprisonment” or having one’s “release from imprisonment 
blocked.” See ACLU, supra note 29. 
 103. Even though President Obama’s policy involves closing Guantánamo Bay, the 
Administration plans to keep some individuals in executive detention if and when closure 
occurs. See DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., FINAL REPORT: GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE 
23–25 (2010) (stating that forty-eight detainees would remain in detention for the duration of 
the war on terror).  
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:44 PM 
2283 Challenging the Executive 
 2303 
detainees will actually suffer punishment.104 Furthermore, the 
restrictions serve a legitimate nonpunitive purpose, as Congress 
intended. The general motivation behind any wartime detention 
policy is to keep captives away from the battlefield.105 In passing the 
restrictions on transfers to other countries, Congress appears to have 
been motivated by a concern that detainees released to other 
countries would return to the battlefield; in passing the prosecution 
restrictions, Congress appears to have been motivated by a policy 
preference for prosecuting wartime detainees in military commissions 
rather than civilian courts.106 Thus, the restrictions constitute “an act 
of nonpunitive legislative policymaking” rather than a bill of 
attainder.107 
Because the restrictions in the 2011 National Defense 
Authorization Act do not run afoul of any express constitutional 
restrictions, the inquiry must turn to the sources and scope of 
presidential and congressional power over wartime detention. 
B. Prosecutorial Discretion 
A centerpiece of President Obama’s detention policies is the trial 
of certain detainees in civilian courts.108 The President is traditionally 
given wide discretion to execute the laws, particularly in criminal 
prosecutions. When Attorney General Holder announced that the 
Administration would move forward with military commissions in 
light of the legislative restrictions on prosecutions in civilian courts, 
 
 104. The argument that the restrictions constitute an unconstitutional bill of attainder 
might be stronger with respect to Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, who is specifically named in the 
2011 National Defense Authorization Act, and the four other named individuals whom the 
Department of Justice had planned to prosecute in civilian courts. See 2011 National Defense 
Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 1032, 124 Stat. 4351 (phrasing the restriction on 
transfers to the United States in terms of “Khalid Sheikh Mohammed or any other detainee”); 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE ET AL., supra note 103, at 21. 
 105. See infra note 124 and accompanying text. 
 106. See supra Part II. 
 107. See Nixon v. Adm’r Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 477 (1977). If the Law of Nations 
Clause serves as the constitutional source of power for the restrictions in question, the 
restrictions would in some regard have a punitive overtone. See U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 10 
(“The Congress shall have Power . . . To define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of 
Nations . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also infra notes 151–163, 177–179, and accompanying 
text. However, basing legislative action in a punitive power is not inconsistent with finding a 
nonpunitive policy motivating the legislature.  
 108. See, e.g., ERIC HOLDER, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, ATTORNEY GENERAL ANNOUNCES 
FORUM DECISIONS FOR GUANTANAMO DETAINEES, (Nov. 13, 2009), available at 
http://www.justice.gov/ag/speeches/2009/ag-speech-091113.html. 
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he stated that “[d]ecisions about who, where and how to prosecute 
have always been—and must remain—the responsibility of the 
executive branch.”109 
Prosecutorial discretion arises from the Vesting and Take Care 
Clauses.110 The Vesting Clause declares that “[t]he executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”111 
The Take Care Clause states that the President “shall take Care that 
the Laws be faithfully executed . . . .”112 Together, these provisions 
solidly place in the President the power of executing the law.  
But before determining whether the Vesting and Take Care 
Clauses grant exclusive authority to the executive to determine 
matters of “who, where and how to prosecute,” we should first 
determine the appropriate meaning of the clauses. Some scholars 
have argued that the Take Care Clause confers a duty rather than a 
power on the President.113 This would eliminate any redundancy 
with the Vesting Clause. However, resolving this dispute is not 
necessary to determine whether the Clause limits the congressional 
action in question. Assuming the Clause grants power, it grants 
power only to “faithfully execute[]” the laws.114 Faithful execution of 
the laws would presumably refer to all aspects of a law, including the 
conditions, provisos, and limitations enacted as part of a law. The 
Clause would lose all meaning if the President were not bound by 
the restrictions set forth in the statutes to be executed. In other 
words, the Take Care Clause at most grants the power to execute the 
laws, not to make the laws. 
Similarly, the Vesting Clause grants executive authority, as 
distinguished from legislative or judicial authority.115 Any power 
 
 109. Holder, supra note 40. 
 110. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 697–99, 705–08 (1988) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (prefacing a discussion of prosecutorial discretion with an examination of the 
Vesting Clauses); Rebecca Krauss, The Theory of Prosecutorial Discretion in Federal Law: 
Origins and Developments, 6 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 1, 9–10 (2009) (identifying the Take 
Care Clause and general separation-of-powers principles as the most common justifications for 
prosecutorial discretion). 
 111. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 112. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 113. See William B. Gwyn, The Indeterminacy of the Separation of Powers and the Federal 
Courts, 57 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 474, 484–85, 491–92 (1989). 
 114. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 115. Compare id. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a 
Congress of the United States . . . .”) and id. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United 
States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may 
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granted by the Vesting or Take Care Clauses would indeed be 
exclusive, but that would only preclude Congress from usurping the 
power of execution from the President. Impinging upon the 
exclusive prosecutorial functions of the President would entail the 
unlikely scenario of Congress attempting to prosecute detainees itself 
or to assign that power to an entity outside the executive branch. 
Defining the conditions of prosecution—which is what every 
criminal law does in essence—does not infringe on the exclusive 
power of the President. In the course of the war, the President is 
charged with “carry[ing] into effect all laws passed by Congress for 
the conduct of war and for the government and regulation of the 
Armed Forces, and all laws defining and punishing offenses against 
the law of nations, including those which pertain to the conduct of 
war.”116 The contours of such laws, however, are defined by 
Congress. Furthermore, to the extent prosecutorial discretion is 
grounded in general separation-of-powers concerns, it primarily deals 
with separation between the executive and the judiciary.117 
Therefore, the restrictions in the 2011 National Defense 
Authorization Act are not invalidated by the Vesting Clause or the 
Take Care Clause. 
C. Wartime Detention Authority 
The authority to detain enemies in a time of war has long been 
viewed as an important war power of the government.118 As a war 
power, presidential detention authority would derive from the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause if its source is constitutional. History 
suggests that Congress also has concurrent detention authority. 
During the 1798–1800 Quasi-War with France, for example, 
Congress passed several laws authorizing detention of French 
captives, setting conditions on detention, and authorizing the 
 
from time to time ordain and establish.”), with id. art. II, § 1, cl. 1 (“The executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”). 
 116. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 26 (1942). 
 117. See Krauss, supra note 110, at 2–15. 
 118. See, e.g., United States ex rel. Standing Bear v. Crook, 25 F. Cas. 695, 700 (C.C.D. 
Neb. 1879) (No. 14,891) (“[T]he government might, in time of war, remove them to any 
place of safety so long as the war should last, but perhaps no longer, unless they were charged 
with the commission of some crime. This is a war power merely, and exists in time of war only. 
Every nation exercises the right to arrest and detain an alien enemy during the existence of a 
war, and all subjects or citizens of the hostile nations are subject to be dealt with under this 
rule.”). 
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exchange or release of prisoners.119 The regulations passed in the 
Quasi-War demonstrate the understanding of Congress that it had 
authority to regulate detention, but this history does not clearly 
reveal the source of that authority.120 Possible sources of 
congressional detention authority include the Captures Clause, the 
power of the purse, and the Law of Nations Clause.121 
1. Commander-in-Chief Clause 
Wartime detention authority is rooted in the law of war, a branch 
of the law of nations, or, as it is known today, customary 
international law. “From the very beginning of its history [the 
Supreme] Court has recognized and applied the law of war as 
including that part of the law of nations which prescribes, for the 
conduct of war, the status, rights and duties of enemy nations as well 
as of enemy individuals.”122 In Ex parte Quirin, the Supreme Court 
identified detention authority as “[a]n important incident to the 
conduct of war,” founded in the law of war.123 In a plurality decision, 
 
 119. Act of June 28, 1798, ch. 62, § 4, 1 Stat. 574, 575 (authorizing detainees to be 
held “in any place of safety within the United States, in such manner as [the President] may 
think the public interest may require”); Act of July 9, 1798, ch. 68, § 8, 1 Stat. 578, 580 
(directing federal civil or military officers to “take charge for [the detainees’] safe keeping and 
support, at the expense of the United States”); Act of Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 624 
(authorizing the President “to exchange or send away from the United States to the dominions 
of France, as he may deem proper and expedient, all French citizens that have been or may be 
captured and brought into the United States”); Act of Mar. 3, 1799, ch. 45, 1 Stat. 743 
(authorizing the President to impose “the most rigorous retaliation” against any French 
detainee found responsible for maltreating an impressed United States sailor found aboard any 
British ship); see also Barron & Lederman, A Constitutional History, supra note 3, at 971–72, 
977, 981. 
 120. “Congress’s power to dictate the taking and treatment of prisoners seems to have 
been understood during the Revolutionary War and the 1790s, yet the source of that power is 
unclear.” Ingrid Wuerth, The Captures Clause, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 1683, 1744 (2009); see also 
id. at 1722, 1727 (discussing regulations of prisoners in the Revolutionary War and possible 
sources of that authority under the Articles of Confederation); id. at 1734–35 (discussing the 
Quasi-War regulations and pointing to congressional debates suggesting the authority is 
rooted in the Law of Nations Clause or Declare War Clause). 
 121. See Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 1, at 735–36 n.143 
(locating congressional detention authority in the Captures Clause, Law of Nations Clause, 
and Declare War Clause). 
 122. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1942). 
 123. Id. at 28–29 (“An important incident to the conduct of war is the adoption of 
measures by the military command not only to repel and defeat the enemy, but to seize and 
subject to disciplinary measures those enemies who in their attempt to thwart or impede our 
military effort have violated the law of war.”). 
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the Court recently affirmed in the context of the war on terrorism 
that detention—for the duration of the conflict—and prosecution of 
enemy combatants is justified under the law of war to secure the 
battlefield and preserve the ability of the President to prosecute the 
war.124 
Yet the law of war defines rather than grants authority. There 
must be some constitutional or legislative provision that supplies the 
authority, such as the Commander-in-Chief Clause or a 
congressional authorization of war.125 In Ex parte Quirin, the Court 
suggested that the President and Congress may have concurrent 
authority. The Court recognized that the President was acting 
pursuant to an act of Congress in creating military commissions 
during World War II to try detainees for offenses against the law of 
nations.126 But the President was also acting under “such authority as 
the Constitution itself gives the Commander in Chief, to direct the 
performance of those functions which may constitutionally be 
performed by the military arm of the nation in time of war.”127 
Similarly, the plurality in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld found congressional 
authorization for the executive detention of enemy combatants in 
the war on terrorism, and thus did not reach the President’s claim of 
“plenary authority to detain pursuant to Article II of the 
Constitution.”128 More specific to the power to prosecute detainees, 
the Court suggested in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld that the President’s 
power derived solely from congressional authorization: “Congress 
cannot direct the conduct of campaigns, nor can the President, or 
any commander under him, without the sanction of Congress, 
institute tribunals for the trial and punishment of offences.”129 The 
 
 124. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 518 (2004) (plurality opinion) (“The capture 
and detention of lawful combatants and the capture, detention, and trial of unlawful 
combatants, by ‘universal agreement and practice,’ are ‘important incident[s] of war.’” 
(quoting Ex parte  Quirin, 317 U.S. at 28, 30)). 
 125. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 25 (“Congress and the President, like the courts, 
possess no power not derived from the Constitution.”). 
 126. Id. at 28. 
 127. Id. at 26, 28 (“The Constitution thus invests the President, as Commander in Chief, 
with the power to wage war which Congress has declared . . . .”); see U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, 
cl. 1 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United 
States . . . .”). 
 128. Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 516–17 (finding legislative authorization in the Authorization 
for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). 
 129. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 592 (2006) (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 
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Court raised the possibility that the President may have independent 
power “in cases of a controlling necessity,” but noted that the Court 
has never definitively resolved that issue and refused to do so in 
Hamdan as well.130 
Thus, the Court has suggested—but never squarely held—that 
when Congress authorizes the President’s war powers, the 
Commander-in-Chief Clause grants the President powers incident to 
the conduct of war, including authority over wartime detainees. 
2. Captures Clause 
One common source cited for congressional detention authority 
is the Captures Clause.131 As discussed above,132 in setting forth a 
framework for analyzing limits on congressional power, the proper 
scope of each constitutional grant must be determined before 
deciding whether constitutional power over a particular matter is 
exclusive or concurrent.  The Captures Clause appears on its face to 
grant Congress authority to regulate detention: Congress has power 
to “make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water.”133 Chief 
Justice John Marshall suggested as much in dicta in an 1814 case.134 
Yet Professor Ingrid Wuerth has argued recently—and quite 
persuasively—that the original meaning of the Captures Clause was 
in fact intended only as a source of authority over enemy property.135 
Wuerth argues that the Clause is best understood as granting power 
over “moveable property taken for adjudication as prize, but not 
persons,” and “the power to authorize the making of captures and 
also to determine their legality.”136 The natural implication of 
Professor Wuerth’s analysis is that the Captures Clause cannot serve 
as a solid basis for congressional limitation on the President’s  
 
 
U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 139–40 (1866) (Chase, C.J., concurring)). 
 130.  Id. at 592–93 (quoting Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. at 140). 
 131. See, e.g., Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 1, at 735 n.143; 
Lobel, supra note 75, at 457. 
 132. See supra Part III.B.3. 
 133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 11. 
 134. See Brown v. United States, 12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110, 126 (1814); see also Barron & 
Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 1, at 733, 735 n.143. 
 135. See generally, Wuerth, supra note 120. 
 136.  Id. at 1744–45. Wuerth acknowledges, however, that her research revealed 
“countervailing evidence”; she cautions against reading more clarity into the text and history of 
the Constitution than is warranted. Id. at 1744.  
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detention authority. Congressional authority must be found in the 
power of the purse or the Law of Nations Clause. 
3. Power of the purse 
While the Constitution does not explicitly grant the power of the 
purse to Congress, a number of provisions read together make it 
clear that “[t]he Legislature . . . commands the purse . . . .”137 The 
most prominent textual support is phrased as a restriction supposedly 
directed at the executive branch rather than an explicit grant of 
power to Congress: “No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, 
but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law . . . .”138 
Congress not only has authority to collect funds for the Treasury but 
is also authorized “to pay the Debts and provide for the common 
Defence and general Welfare . . . .”139 Congress has power “To raise 
and support Armies”140 and “provide and maintain a Navy.”141 
Furthermore, the Necessary and Proper Clause142 shores up the other 
clauses to create a solid constitutional foundation for congressional 
control over spending.143 
Congress has successfully invoked its spending power to end or 
restrict military engagements in Southeast Asia, Angola, Nicaragua, 
and Somalia.144 Some of these restrictions left the President with 
considerable discretion,145 while others were more absolute.146 The 
 
 137. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 425 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 138. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. 
 139. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 140. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 12. 
 141. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 13. 
 142. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
 143. Stith, supra note 55, at 1348; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 425 (Alexander 
Hamilton) (E.H. Scott ed. 1898); Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 11, at 838–45 
(describing the appropriations power as a substantive, significant congressional power). 
 144. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-139, § 
8151(b)(2)(B), 107 Stat. 1476 (1993) (Somalia); Act of Oct. 30, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-591, 
§ 216, 100 Stat. 3341-307 (Nicaragua); International Security Assistance and Arms Exports 
Control Act, Pub L. No. 94-329, § 404, 90 Stat. 757 (1976) (Angola); Act of July 1, 1973, 
Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 134 (Southeast Asia); Second Supplemental Appropriations 
Act, Pub. L. No. 93-50, § 307, 87 Stat. 129 (1973) (same). 
 145. See Department of Defense Appropriations Act 1994, Pub L. No. 103-139, § 
8151(b)(2)(B)(ii), 107 Stat. 1476 (1993) (adding a number of qualifications to the general 
restriction of funding for military action in Somalia, including “[t]hat nothing herein shall be 
deemed to restrict in any way the authority of the President under the Constitution to protect 
the lives of Americans”).  
 146. See Act of July 1, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-52, § 108, 87 Stat. 134 (“Notwithstanding 
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power to end war could be seen as a necessary and proper incident of 
the power of Congress to declare war,147 yet these funding 
restrictions have typically been justified solely on grounds of 
congressional power over spending.148 Indeed, the connection of 
several of the funding clauses to war powers suggests that the power 
of the purse was intended as a particularly potent check on the 
President’s war-making powers. For example, the restriction on 
Congress’s appropriations power requiring that funds for the army 
must be renewed every two years149 was seen historically as a 
requirement that Congress not abrogate its oversight role, lest a 
standing army be maintained and used without the consent of the 
people.150 Thus, Congress appears to have power to regulate the 
conduct of war at least to some degree through its appropriations 
power. 
4. Law of Nations Clause 
The Law of Nations Clause gives Congress the power to “define 
and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations.”151 On its face, 
this Clause may not be an obvious source of congressional detention 
authority. Indeed, in categorizing the powers of Congress in The 
Federalist Papers, James Madison classified the Law of Nations 
 
any other provision of law, on or after August 15, 1973, no funds herein or heretofore 
appropriated may be obligated or expended to finance directly or indirectly combat activities 
by United States military forces in or over or from off the shores of North Vietnam, South 
Vietnam, Laos or Cambodia.”). 
 147. Cf. Barron & Lederman, Framing the Problem, supra note 1 at 734 (“Congress’s 
power to ‘declare War’ has been interpreted to encompass the lesser included power to limit 
the scope and nature of hostilities in which U.S. armed forces may engage.”). 
 148. See Fisher, Purse Strings, supra note 61, at 763; Stith, supra note 55, at 1360–61 
(noting that Congress turned to funding restrictions on the war in Southeast Asia “only after a 
statutory ‘declaration of policy’—not tied to continued funding—had failed to achieve that 
end”). 
 149. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 12. 
 150. Alexander Hamilton described this provision as “a precaution which, upon a nearer 
view of it, will appear to be a great and real security against military establishments without 
evident necessity.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 24, at 131 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 
1898); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 26 at 143 (Alexander Hamilton) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898) 
(“They are not at liberty to vest in the Executive department permanent funds for the support 
of an army, if they were even incautious enough to be willing to repose in it so improper a 
confidence.”). 
 151. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 10 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of 
Nations . . . .”). 
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Clause as part of a “class of powers” involving “Regulation of the 
intercourse with foreign nations” rather than “Security against 
foreign danger.”152 The latter class involved “those [powers] of 
declaring war and granting letters of marque; of providing armies 
and fleets; of regulating and calling forth the militia; of levying an 
borrowing money,”153 while the Law of Nations Clause was classified 
with powers “to make treaties; to send and receive ambassadors, 
other public ministers, and consuls; to define and punish piracies and 
felonies committed on the high seas, . . . to regulate foreign 
commerce,” and the slave importation clauses.154 
Yet this dichotomy is consistent with grounding detention 
authority in the Law of Nations Clause. Wartime detention is 
governed by the law of war, which is a subset of the law of nations. 
Congressional power under the Law of Nations Clause may 
sometimes relate to the security of the nation, but it will always relate 
to the nation’s interaction with the international legal community. 
The security implications of wartime detention do not diminish its 
foreign policy implications.155 The Supreme Court has recognized 
the connection between the Law of Nations Clause and detention 
authority, particularly in relation to congressional authority to create 
military commissions to try detainees.156 During World War II, the 
Court held in Ex parte Quirin that the Law of Nations Clause 
granted Congress authority to provide for trial by military 
commission of anyone who violated the law of war.157  
Congress’s power under the Law of Nations Clause can be 
categorized as regulatory and jurisdictional. The regulatory aspect of 
the Clause is rooted in both the power to “define . . . Offenses” and 
to “punish” offenders. Two aspects of this regulatory power require 
clarification: the class of possible offenders and the scope of the 
 
 152. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 41, at 224, 42 (James Madison) (E. H. Scott ed., 1898). 
 153. Id. NO. 41, at 224. 
 154. Id. NO. 42, at 233. 
 155. Cf. Wuerth, supra note 120, at 1737 (“A reprisal power that extended to taking 
people—already uncommon by the late eighteenth century—might have been given to 
Congress by virtue of its power to ‘define and punish . . . Offenses against the Law of Nations. 
. . . Reprisals were granted as a response to wrongdoing by other countries, and were thus one 
means of punishing an offense against the law of nations.”). 
 156. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Laws of War as a Constitutional Limit on Military 
Jurisdiction, 4 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 295, 315–25 (2010) (discussing Supreme Court cases 
dealing with military commissions). 
 157. Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 27–28 (1942). 
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power to define offenses. First, the law of nations can be violated not 
only by individuals—such as the Guantánamo Bay detainees—but 
also by governments.158 Second, Congress’s power under the Clause 
goes beyond mere domestic replication of the law of nations: it can 
also prohibit activities “well beyond the contemporaneous 
international law.”159 Furthermore, Congress may enact laws in 
derogation of the law of nations.160 Thus, when Congress 
incorporates the law of nations into domestic law, it can enact 
requirements on individuals and the President that are either more or 
less stringent than the law of nations. 
The jurisdictional aspect of the Clause is rooted in the power to 
“punish” offenders. As illustrated in Ex parte Quirin, the power to 
establish tribunals to punish offenses against the law of nations has 
traditionally been seen as a central power granted by the Clause.161 
In order to punish individual offenders, Congress would need to 
establish a tribunal with jurisdiction to do so, or vest an existing 
tribunal with such jurisdiction.162 By extension, Congress would also 
have the authority to determine the jurisdictional question of where 
detainees may not be prosecuted. Similarly, the Law of Nations 
 
 158. J. Andrew Kent, Congress’s Under-Appreciated Power to Define and Punish Offenses 
Against the Law of Nations, 85 TEX. L. REV. 843, 849–53 (2007) (describing a “dual 
conception” of the Clause that allows “power to regulate both individuals and states (foreign 
or American)”); Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 11, at 906–08. 
 159. Raven-Hansen & Banks, supra note 11, at 906–07 (“Congress is not confined to 
domesticating international law . . . .”). 
 160. Cf. Murray v. Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804). The 
Charming Betsy canon entails a strong presumption against interpreting statutes as conflicting 
with the law of nations, id., but it necessarily implies that Congress has the power to pass laws 
contrary to the law of nations. 
 161. See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. at 27–28; see also Kent, supra note 158, at 896–902. 
Describing the drafting history of the Law of Nations Clause, Professor Andrew Kent argues 
that the Framers rejected a narrower version of the Clause—which focused on the power to 
establish tribunals and authorize punishment—in favor of a broader version—which “gives an 
unmediated and direct power to Congress itself to ‘punish.’” See Kent, supra note 158, at 900. 
In adopting the broader language, it is unlikely that the Framers intended to exclude the 
narrower jurisdictional power.  
 162. For example, when Congress first passed a law defining the crime of piracy, it 
included a provision designating where such offenses could be prosecuted. See Act of Apr. 30, 
1790, ch. 9, § 8, 1 Stat. 112, 113–14 (“[T]he trial of crimes committed on the high seas, or in 
any place out of the jurisdiction of any particular state, shall be in the district where the 
offender is apprehended, or into which he may first be brought.”). The power to define and 
punish piracies is a companion to the power to define and punish offense against the law of 
nations. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To define and 
punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offenses against the Law of 
Nations . . . .”). 
DO NOT DELETE 12/20/2011 3:44 PM 
2283 Challenging the Executive 
 2313 
Clause, coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause, would grant 
Congress the power to determine the location of the detainee in 
order to protect its power to punish offenders.163 
Therefore, the Law of Nations Clause gives Congress authority 
to authorize detention, determine the location of detention, set 
jurisdictional parameters for trial, and enact other regulations which 
would limit the President’s detention authority. Coupled with the 
power of the purse to regulate military affairs, this Clause gives 
Congress significant authority over wartime detention. Thus, the 
President’s authority is not exclusive in this area, and the restrictions 
on transferring detainees to the United States for prosecution are 
constitutional. 
D. Foreign Affairs & Third-Country Transfer Restrictions 
 The restrictions on transfers to other countries may present a 
closer question. The restrictions place significant burdens on the 
President’s ability to negotiate with other countries. The President 
must demand that the receiving country share intelligence with the 
United States and, when necessary, take steps to strengthen its 
detention system.164 Although the conditions do not explicitly 
regulate the President’s negotiation power, they have that effect: 
intelligence-sharing and security guarantees must be part of any 
transfer agreement negotiated by the President. The restrictions also 
prohibit sending detainees to countries that have had past problems 
with recidivism, although they give the President some discretion by 
allowing for a national security exception to this restriction.165 An 
examination of presidential and congressional authority over foreign 
affairs—and negotiations in particular—suggests that the two 
branches may share concurrent authority over this issue. 
1. Presidential foreign affairs power 
In United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the Supreme 
Court declared that the President is “the sole organ of the federal 
 
 163. See, e.g., Act of June 28, 1798, ch. 62, § 4, 1 Stat. 574, 575 (authorizing 
confinement “in any place of safety within the United States” for French prisoners captured in 
the Quasi-War of 1798–1800). 
 164. 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, Pub. L. No. 111–383, § 1033(b), 124 
Stat. 4351–52. See discussion of the specific restrictions on the transfer of detainees to other 
countries, supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 165. 2011 National Defense Authorization Act, § 1033(c), 124 Stat. 4352. 
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government in the field of international relations.”166 Although the 
President has traditionally held broad authority over foreign affairs, 
few constitutional clauses directly address such power: the President 
has power, “with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make 
Treaties” and nominate and appoint ambassadors and consuls,167 and 
to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers.”168 Given the 
limited scope of explicit constitutional authority over foreign affairs, 
the President’s foreign affairs power has been read broadly 
throughout history to incorporate several implied powers derived 
from the few express powers in the Constitution.169  
The restrictions on the transfer of detainees to other countries 
could arguably infringe on the President’s power to negotiate with 
foreign countries.170 The negotiation power is inherent in the power 
to make treaties and the power to receive ambassadors. Like the 
power to receive ambassadors, the power to make treaties—as 
opposed to advise on and consent to the adoption of a treaty—is 
viewed as an exclusive executive power.171 Many have argued that the 
“negotiation prerogative,” therefore, would also be exclusive to the 
President.172 As the Court declared in Curtiss-Wright, “the President 
alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the 
nation. He makes treaties with the advice and consent of the Senate; 
 
 166. 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
 167. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 168. Id. art. II, § 3. 
 169. See, e.g., LOUIS HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES 
CONSTITUTION 13–45 (2d ed 1996) (discussing theories used to justify the President’s 
historically broad foreign affairs authority). 
 170. See discussion of the specific restrictions on the transfer of detainees to other 
countries at supra notes 30–31 and accompanying text. 
 171. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; see also James Wilson, Speech to the Pennsylvania 
Convention, Dec. 4, 1787, in 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS, ON THE 
ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 434 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1836) (“The 
Senate can make no treaties: they can approve of none, unless the President of the United 
States lays it before them.”); id. at 443 (“With regard to their power in forming treaties, they 
can make none[;] they are only auxiliaries to the President.”). 
 172. See Phillip R. Trimble, The President’s Foreign Affairs Power, 83 AM. J. INT’L L. 750, 
755 (1989) (“Everyone agrees that the President has the exclusive power of official 
communication with foreign governments. This power includes the related power to negotiate 
agreements—on any matter—subject to any necessary implementing action to give the 
agreement domestic legal effect.”); see also Issues Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization 
Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 37–41 (1990) (stating that Congress may not dictate the makeup of 
an international delegation). 
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but he alone negotiates. Into the field of negotiation the Senate 
cannot intrude; and Congress itself is powerless to invade it.”173  
Curtiss-Wright recognizes that at the core of the negotiation 
process lies an exclusive presidential power. But this recognition does 
not end the analysis. The full extent of the President’s exclusive 
power can only be determined by examining congressional power—if 
any—over foreign affairs and negotiations in particular.  
2. Congressional foreign affairs power 
Several constitutional provisions ensure a role for Congress in 
foreign affairs. The Foreign Commerce Clause gives Congress a 
significant role in foreign relations by allowing Congress to institute 
embargoes and economic sanctions against other countries.174 The 
power of the purse gives Congress the authority to fund not only the 
international agreements entered into by the President, but also the 
negotiating effort itself.175 Furthermore, the Constitution envisions 
some role in the treaty formation process for the Senate: “[The 
President] shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators 
present concur . . . .”176 Although the Senate’s role is often seen as 
merely voting on the treaties, the text of the Treaties Clause suggests 
two stages of involvement: advising and consenting to the making of 
a treaty, and voting on the finished product. 
As discussed above, the Law of Nations Clause provides 
Congress certain powers over foreign affairs.177 The Clause embodies 
“a foreign affairs power” that gives Congress “substantial powers of 
initiative regarding coercive international policymaking.”178 
However, the power to punish foreign states does not appear to be 
the source of authority for the transfer restrictions in the 2011 
National Defense Authorization Act. Rather, those restrictions 
appear to be based in the power to punish individuals. Just as the 
 
 173. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (emphasis 
omitted). 
 174. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To regulate 
Commerce with foreign Nations . . . .”); Kent, supra note 157, at 916. 
 175. See Louis Fisher, Congressional Participation in the Treaty Process, 137 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1511, 1519–22 (1988–1989) [hereinafter Fisher, Treaty Process]. 
 176. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 177. See supra notes 151–62 and accompanying text. 
 178. Kent, supra note 158, at 856, 911–24. 
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power to punish detainees would logically require power to maintain 
control over the location and custody of the detainees, the power to 
punish would also require power to control the terms of release.179 
This suggests congressional power to set the terms of negotiations to 
transfer, release, or exchange detainees with other countries. 
This reading of the Law of Nations Clause appears inconsistent 
with the traditionally broad interpretation of the President’s foreign 
affairs authority, particularly over negotiations. It is useful, therefore, 
to examine historical practice to determine whether congressional 
authority over negotiations truly is unprecedented. “Past practice 
does not, by itself, create power,”180 but history and practical effect 
may put a useful “gloss” on the powers granted in the 
Constitution.181 
Early historical practice demonstrates that Congress did have a 
role in communications with foreign nations, at least in terms of 
setting national objectives and the outer parameters of 
negotiations.182 The history of early U.S. relations with the Barbary 
States demonstrates this role in a way that implicated Congress’s 
appropriations, foreign commerce, and law of nations powers. As 
corsairs from Algiers increased their attacks on American merchant 
ships in the 1790s, the House of Representatives requested a report 
from Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson regarding the situation in 
the Mediterranean.183 In his report to both houses of Congress, 
 
 179. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . To make all 
Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers . . . 
.”). Congress authorized the exchange of prisoners in the Quasi-War with France. See Act of 
Feb. 28, 1799, ch. 28, 1 Stat. 624. Although the authorization did not place restrictions on 
the release and instead authorized the President to exchange or release prisoners “as he may 
deem proper and expedient,” id., the authorization suggests that the early Congress believed it 
had a role in initiating the process that would lead to termination of detention. 
 180. Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 686 (1981); see also INS v. Chadha, 462 
U.S. 919, 944 (1983) (“[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient, convenient, and 
useful in facilitating functions of government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to 
the Constitution.”). 
 181. See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 610–11 (1952) 
(Frankfurter, J., concurring) (“[A] systematic, unbroken, executive practice, long pursued to 
the knowledge of the Congress and never before questioned, engaged in by Presidents who 
have also sworn to uphold the Constitution, making as it were such exercise of power part of 
the structure of our government, may be treated as a gloss on ‘executive Power’ vested in the 
President by § 1 of Art. II.”). 
 182. See Fisher, Treaty Process, supra note 175, at 1512–16 (noting that some early 
presidents sought advice from the Senate before entering into treaties). 
 183. See Report of the Secretary of State Relative to the Mediterranean Trade (Dec. 28, 
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Jefferson presented three options: continue to pay ransom for 
captured American citizens, “obtain peace by purchasing it” like 
European states had done, or “repel force by force.”184 Jefferson 
closed his letter by stating that it was up to Congress to choose 
among these objectives, to limit the funding available to carry out 
the chosen objective, and to determine whether to allow the 
President to secure the assistance of allies in any war effort: 
Upon the whole, it rests with Congress to decide between war, 
tribute, and ransom, as the means of re-establishing our 
Mediterranean commerce. If war, they will consider how far our 
own resources shall be called forth, and how far they will enable the 
Executive to engage, in the forms of the constitution, the co-
operation of other Powers. If tribute or ransom, it will rest with 
them to limit and provide the amount; and with the Executive, 
observing the same constitutional forms, to make arrangements for 
employing it to the best advantage.185 
In response, Congress chose a dual course of preparing for war 
while negotiating peace. It authorized the building of six frigates, 
but stipulated that the construction should cease “if a peace shall 
take place between the United States and the Regency of Algiers.”186 
James Madison favored negotiations over rebuilding the navy.187 He 
suggested an alternative resolution that would appropriate a specified 
sum of money for the negotiations.188 Although Madison’s 
resolution would have given the President flexibility in pursuing 
negotiations “in such manner as should be found most effectual for 
obtaining a peace,” it necessarily would have set specific restrictions 
on the terms of negotiations by appropriating a specified sum of 
money to pay for the peace.189 Furthermore, it would have provided 
an alternative objective: if peace was not possible for that sum, the 
President should use the money to negotiate with European powers 
 
1790), in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS: FOREIGN RELATIONS, No. 44, at 104–05 (1833). 
 184. Id. at 104–05. 
 185. Id. at 105. 
 186. Act of Mar. 27, 1794, ch. 12, §§ 1, 9, 1 Stat 350, 350–51. 
 187. See 4 ANNALS OF CONGRESS 433 (1794). 
 188. See id. at 438 (“That the sum of --- dollars be provided to be employed in such 
manner as should be found most effectual for obtaining a peace with the Regency of Algiers; 
and failing of this, that the sum should be applied to the end of obtaining protection from 
some of the European Powers.” (internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 189. See id. 
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to obtain protection in the Mediterranean.190 In the end, Congress 
adopted a generic appropriations bill, worded as any other 
contemporary bill funding negotiations with foreign nations: “That a 
sum of one million dollars . . . be appropriated to defray any 
expenses which may be incurred, in relation to the intercourse 
between the United States and foreign nations . . . .”191 Nevertheless, 
this still set the outer limits of the President’s authority to negotiate 
with Algiers. 
Congressional involvement in setting the objects and parameters 
of negotiations is not necessarily inconsistent with a view of the 
President as the “sole organ” of the government in foreign affairs. 
The term “sole organ” originates with John Marshall as he served in 
the House of Representatives, and he used the term to refer to the 
President as the sole organ for communicating with foreign 
nations.192 “Marshall’s ‘sole organ’ observation merely stands for the 
unproblematic proposition that the President is the conduit for 
formal interaction with foreign states.”193 Certainly, any attempt to 
usurp the negotiation function from the President would intrude on 
an exclusive presidential power. Congress could not, for example, 
send its own envoy to negotiate on behalf of the United States.194 
Yet the historical record suggests that Congress has some 
constitutional authority in the arena of negotiations. The President 
may indeed “be most competent to determine when, how, and upon 
what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of 
 
 190. See id. 
 191. Act of Mar. 20, 1794, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 345. At the time, a typical annual appropriation 
for foreign relations was between $40,000 and $60,000. See Act of Jul. 1, 1790, ch. 22, § 1, 1 
Stat. 128; Act of May 8, 1792, ch. 41, § 3, 1 Stat. 284, 285; Act of Feb. 9, 1793, ch. 4, 1 Stat. 
299, 300; Act of May 7, 1793, ch. 41, § 2, 1 Stat. 487. 
 192. See generally Michael P. Van Alstine, Taking Care of John Marshall’s Political Ghost, 
53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 93 (2008–2009) (discussing the historical and political context of 
Marshall’s comment). 
 193. Id. at 128 (citation omitted). Cf. HENKIN, supra note 169, at 41 (“Spokesman, 
even ‘representative’, does not necessarily imply that the President has authority to determine 
the content of what he should communicate, to make national policy.”). 
 194. Some presidents have included legislators in international delegations. See Fisher, 
Treaty Process, supra note 175, at 1517 (citation omitted). Such inclusion would not impede 
on the President’s exclusive negotiation authority because the legislators participated at the 
invitation of the President as part of an envoy headed by the executive branch. Cf. Issues 
Raised by Foreign Relations Authorization Bill, 14 Op. O.L.C. 37, 37–41 (1990) (stating that 
an appropriations requirement was unconstitutional because it would deny funding for certain 
international negotiations unless the delegation included members of a congressionally 
appointed body). 
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success.”195 Setting aside arguments of institutional competence, 
however, when Congress acts through one of its foreign affairs 
powers, it has concurrent authority to determine foreign policy and 
at least set broad terms of negotiations.  
When Congress restricted the President’s authority to transfer 
detainees to foreign countries, it did so through the appropriations 
power and its power to define and punish offenses against the law of 
nations. These foreign affairs powers give Congress concurrent 
authority over the policies and scope of negotiations in the present 
case. Therefore, the restrictions are constitutional even though they 
arguably dictate some terms of any negotiation the President may 
undertake to transfer detainees.  
V. CONCLUSION 
Congress and the President share concurrent constitutional 
authority over wartime detention. The two political branches also 
share some concurrent authority over the field of negotiation, 
although the overlap may be less than in the area of detention. Given 
this concurrent power, Congress may restrain the authority of the 
President as long as the Constitution does not expressly prohibit 
congressional action or require Congress to act otherwise. The 
restrictions in the 2011 National Defense Authorization Act do not 
run afoul of any such provisions, including the Suspension Clause 
and the Bill of Attainder Clause. Therefore, the restrictions are 
constitutional.  
Although Congress has constitutionally restrained the President, 
the President certainly is not powerless in this continuing clash over 
detention policy. But while the restrictions are in place, the 
President’s power is political rather than constitutional. The 
President may persuade opponents using arguments about the 
institutional advantages of presidential discretion and initiative, or 
cajole opponents using veto threats and other forms of political 





 195. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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concurrent constitutional power, the President is constitutionally 
bound to comply.  
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